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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of product and labor market regulations on informality
and unemployment in a general framework where formal and informal rms are subject to
the same externalities, diering only with respect to some parameter values. Both formal
and informal rms have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching
friction in the labor market, and wages are determined through bargaining between large
rms and their workers. The informal sector is found to be endogenously more competitive
than the formal one. We nd that lower strictness of product or labor market regulations lead
to a simultaneous reduction in informality and unemployment. The dierence between these
two policy options lies on their eect on wages. Lessening product market strictness increases
wages in both sector but also increases the formal sector wage premium. The opposite is
true for labor market regulation. Finally, we show that the so-called overhiring externality
due to wage bargaining translates into a smaller relative size of the informal sector.
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1 Introduction
Informal activities are pervasive in both developed and developing economies. According to
Schneider and Enste (2000) estimates, the size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP
ranges from 25 to 60% in Latin America, from 13 to 50% in Asia, and it is around 15% among
OECD countries, reaching 30% in some European countries. Informal rms dier from formal
ones in a number of measurable characteristics, and there is a growing literature trying to
understand the causes of informality and its dierences from formal businesses.
In developing countries, in particular, informality seems to be omnipresent in virtually all
sectors of the economy. In Brazil, about 60% of all food-retailing market is operated by informal
marketplaces, and about one third of all processed meat comes from informal businesses. Similar
ratios are found in audiovisual and software sector, pharmaceutical industry, gasoline retailing,
and so on (see Capp and Jones, 2005). We take the view that, in developing countries, informal
rms should be taken as being subject to the same economic environment and they should face
the same externalities as the formal ones, except, of course, for the fact that informal rms do
not comply with taxes and regulations.
In this spirit, we propose a general framework where formal and informal rms are equal in
all aspects, except for the value of some exogenous parameters related to labor market matching
technology, productivity, workers' bargaining power and, evidently, entry costs and labor taxes.
Our numerical simulation is successful in replicating the key characteristics of the Brazilian
economy. We study the eects of changes in product market regulation (PMR) modeled as
changes in entry costs in the formal sector, and of changes in labor market regulation (LMR),
proxied by changes in workers' bargaining power, on the main endogenous variables of the
model. We nd that a fall in PMR strictness reduces unemployment and the size of the informal
sector while it raises wages. A fall in LMR, on its turn, also reduces both unemployment and
informality, but it reduces wages.
One noteworthy feature of our model is that the number and size of rms are endogenously
determined. Our model endogenously generates a more competitive informal sector, which is in
line with empirical evidence. Moreover, we show that both a fall in PMR and in LMR render
the formal sector closer to the informal one in terms of competitiveness.
We chose Brazil as our benchmark case since it is a developing economy with a large informal
sector. Brazil's informal sector employs around 40% of its labor force, while the country's
unemployment rate ranged from 7% to 13% over the last decade. Moreover, Brazil has relatively
high barriers to entry in the product market (Djankov et al., 2002), while labor legislations
appear relatively moderate compared to some other Latin American countries (Botero et al.,
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2004). In this perspective, it is interesting to examine how unemployment and informality would
react, had the government chosen a dierent mix between product and labor market regulations,
that is, lower barriers to entry and/or stricter labor regulations.
There is a recent and growing literature on unemployment and informality in developing
countries. Our analysis highlights distortions that have not yet been contemplated by previous
models as being shared by both formal and informal sectors. In sum, in our model: (i) there
are frictions in both formal and informal labor markets; (ii) job seekers are identical and can
nd jobs in both sectors, that is, the labor market is not segmented; (iii) the number and size
of rms in each sector is endogenous, which renders market power also endogenous; (iv) wages
are set through bargaining between large rms and their workers, which generates externalities
in the two sectors.
It is worth highlighting that, with respect to the labor market, we consider two sources of
distortions. First, there are the standard congestion externalities linked to the matching process.
Second, there are distortions resulting from wage bargaining between rms and workers, which
may generate either over- or underhiring. These wage bargaining distortions were not considered
in previous literature on informality. The size of overhiring is related to workers bargaining power
and to the price elasticity of demand faced by rms. Since those two features are allowed to dier
across sectors, the size of the overhiring externality itself may vary across sectors. Our numerical
exercises indicate that overhiring takes place in the formal sector, while there is underhiring in
the informal sector. This translates into a smaller relative size of the informal sector compared
to the case without overhiring.
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), a number of recent papers have studied the impact
of PMR and LMR on unemployment in economies with frictions in the labor market (e.g.
Delacroix, 2006, Ebell and Haefke, 2009, Felbermayr and Prat, 2010). Those studies, however,
do not consider the existence of an informal sector. Given that informality represents a large
share of the economies, it is important to understand the impacts of policies on the informal
sector as well. For instance, the relative size of the informal sector should be responsive to
changes in the costs involved into creating a new business, since many of such costs are avoided
by rms entering the informal sector. Indeed, Figure 1 below illustrates that, among Latin
American countries, the informal sector tends to be larger in countries where barriers to entry
are stricter. Many developing countries tend to have relatively larger barriers to entry of new
businesses (see Djankov et al., 2002), which could be part of the explanation of informality being
more pervasive among those countries.
The economic literature on informality has recently turned its attention to search and match-
3
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Figure 1: Informality and PMR in developing countries
ing models. Zenou (2008) studies the impact of labor market policies on informality, and he
models the formal sector as subject to labor market frictions and presenting unemployment,
while the informal one is taken as being competitive. Although it is generally acknowledged
that one of the advantages of the informal sector relies on the fact that nding a job is eas-
ier, there is at best no appealing evidence that the informal labor market should be a fully
competitive one. In any case, this particular case can easily be embedded in a more general
model incorporating matching frictions in both formal and informal labor markets, as the one
developed in this paper.
In Fugazza and Jacques (2004), there are search frictions in both sectors, but they are
still segmented. Workers are not allowed to seek for jobs in the formal and informal sectors
simultaneously, and they dier with respect to a `moral' cost of working in the informal sector.
In the case of developing countries, there is evidence that the informal sector is a integral part
of the economy, rather than a residual sector in a segmented labor market. Based on the Latin
American experience, Maloney (2004) claims that the informal sector should be viewed as an
unregulated micro-entrepreneurial sector instead. In terms of the unemployed's behavior, for
instance, job seekers in developing countries are likely to look simultaneously for formal and
informal jobs, either because they cannot aord to do otherwise, or because there is less social
stigma related to taking a job in the informal sector. In contrast, in more developed countries
workers look for a job in the informal sector only after having failed to nd one in the formal
sector.
In Satchi and Temple (2009) workers can be employed either in agriculture or in a man-
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ufacturing sector. Agriculture is taken as being perfectly competitive while in manufacturing
there are formal rms subject to matching frictions, and informal self-employed workers who
seek formal jobs. Although there is no labor market segmentation, informality is still viewed as
a disadvantaged or residual sector in that paper.
Kolm and Larsen (2006) and Ulyssea (2009) assume, as we do, that unemployed workers seek
both formal and informal jobs, and that both types of jobs are subject to matching frictions.
Such assumptions on workers' search behavior seem consistent with the empirical evidence on
the Brazilian labor market presented in the next section, where it is shown that there is a
relatively large degree of mobility between formal and informal jobs. This also leads us to argue
that job seekers probably accept both types of jobs and that the formal and informal labor
markets are not segmented for the workers. Kolm and Larsen (2006) analyze the eects of
higher punishment and audit rates on labor market performance, while Ulyssea (2009) focuses
on endogenous dierences in productivity between the two sectors. We abstract from those
considerations to focus on dierences in rm size across sectors, which render their relative
degree of competitiveness endogenous.
Alternatively, Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) and Albrecht et al. (2009) are interested in ex-
plaining the sorting of workers across sectors, and they assume that workers dier in their
productivity. We are aware of the empirical evidence suggesting dierences in workers' skills
and rms' productivity in formal and informal sectors, but the aim of our paper is not to explain
these features. We focus, instead, on explaining dierences in rms size and competitiveness
across sectors, as well as the impact of PMR and LMR on unemployment, the relative size of
informal and formal sector, and their relative wages.
A common assumption to all those previous models is that each rm is allowed to hire only
one worker. We depart from this assumption and let rms hire as many workers as they desire.
El Badaoui et al. (2010) develop, to our knowledge, the only alternative model in this literature
in which rm size is also an endogenous variable. Based on Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
they build a model with on-the-job search and wage posting (instead of wage bargaining) where
rms' choice of wages determines their size. In our model, however, rms choose their size
directly and wages are a result of a bargaining process between large rms and their workers.
Additionally, rms size will ultimately have an eect on the number of rms in a sector, which,
in turn, impacts rms' market power in the goods market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts for the Brazilian
economy. The theoretical model is described in Section 3. The equilibrium is derived in section
4 while section 5 provides some quantitative exercises. Section 6 concludes. Technical details
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are gathered in the appendix.
2 Stylized Facts
We use data from the Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, or PME) con-
ducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) for the greater metropoli-
tan regions of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife.
PME collects information on employment and earnings, as well as on other observable charac-
teristics such as the workers' years of schooling, age, gender, state of residence, sector of activity
and occupation.
In Brazil, all workers formally employed in the private sector are required to have a working
card (`carteira de trabalho'), thus, by observing whether the individual has a valid working card
we are able to sort formal and informal workers.1 Among the self employed, it is also possible to
distinguish those who pay social contributions from those who do not. We then dene informal
workers as those informally employed in the private sector and the self employed who do not pay
social contribution. As shown in Figure 2, from 2003 to 2010 the share of the informal sector
declined from around 40 to 35% in Brazil, while the unemployment rate also decreased from
around 12 to 7%.
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Figure 2: Informality and unemployment in Brazil
1Notice that we also need the information of whether the individual works in the public sector, since public
servants do not hold a working card as well. This question was included in the PME questionnaire from 2002 on.
We then choose to use data starting in 2002. For data prior to 2002 it was not possible to sort informal workers
from those working in the public sector.
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PME interviews the same individual at dierent moments in time for a period of 16 months.
For each individual, four interviews are conducted over the rst four months, then there is an
interval of eight months, and once again the same individual is interviewed for four consecutive
months. Thus the information is gathered in months t, t+1, t+2, t+3, t+12, t+13, t+14 and
t+15. We use the fourth (t+3) and eighth (t+15) interviews of each individual to compute the
transition frequencies across employment states. Table 1 below presents the transitions across
unemployment, formality and informality, where each line displays the state of origin and the col-
umn the destination state. The table depicts some interesting patterns. An unemployed worker
has virtually equal probability of being in either one of the three states one year later. Formal
workers have a probability of 87.4% of remaining formal, while only 71.7% of informal workers
remain informal after one year. Finally, informal workers become formal with a probability of
23.1%, whereas the reverse is true with a frequency of only 9.3%.
State T \ State T+1 Unemployed Employed: Registered
Employed: 
Unregistered
Unemployed 35,8% 32,1% 32,1%
Employed: Registered 3,4% 87,4% 9,3%
Employed: Unregistered 5,3% 23,1% 71,7%
 
Total 6,6% 62,2% 31,2%
246 574                 
3 378                     
Jan 2003-Feb 2010
Estimation Sample Jan 2004-Feb 2010
Monthly Labor Survey (PME) - IBGE
Total Observations (Different Individuals)
Average Observations per Month
Overall Period
Source
Table 1: Transition probabilities
We have also computed the same transition matrix using two alternative subsamples.2 In
rst one we restrict the sample to workers 23 and 65 years old, which corresponds to 155,002
observations. In the second subsample we consider only low-skill workers (those with lower than
high-school education), which amounts to 124,569 observations. In all cases, we get broadly the
same picture, with marginal dierences. In particular, there are more marked dierences in the
probabilities for an unemployed to nd a formal or an informal job using those subsamples. In
the rst subsample, among the unemployed at time t, 34.5% stay unemployed, 31.1% nd a job
in the formal sector, while 34.4% become an informal worker at t+1: In the second subsample,
the same percentages are 34.9%, 29.4 and 35.7% respectively.
2The results are available upon request.
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As shown in Figure 3, formal sector wages are 45 to 55% higher than wages in the informal
sector. We know, however, that formal and informal sector workers dier in a number of
characteristics that aect wages. We then estimate the wage premium in the formal sector
after controlling for observable individual characteristics available in the data.3 Controlled wage
gap is indeed much smaller than the observed one but it is still considerable, ranging from 23
to 30%, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Wage Premium
With respect to rm size, while it is not possible to know the exact number of employees in
a rm, we are able to divide rm size into three categories: the rst one corresponds to rms
with 2 to 5 employees, the second one with 6 to 10 employees, and the third with 11 employees
or more. We create a size index by assigning a number from 1 to 3 to each of these categories.
Figure 4 presents the averages of this size index for the informal and formal sectors. Formal
sector rms are clearly larger than informal ones.
3 The model
We consider an economy with imperfect competition in the goods market and matching fric-
tions in the labor market, populated by a continuum of risk neutral workers whose measure is
normalized to unity. There are two sectors, formal (F ) and informal (I), each producing one of
the two consumption goods available in the economy.
3We run Mincer regressions in cross section for each month, where wages are explained by a dummy for informal
workers, a dummy for each city, and the following worker's characteristics: age, age square, education, education
square, and position in the household.
8
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3
Fi
rm
s 
si
ze
 
 
Informal Sector Formal Sector Mean
Figure 4: Firm size in formal and informal sectors
3.1 The goods market
Households derive utility from consuming goods from both formal and informal sectors, and
their preferences are represented by the following utility function:
U =


1

F C
 1

F + 
1

I C
 1

I
 
 1
(1)
where CF and CI denote a household's consumption of the good produced in the formal and in
the informal sectors, respectively, while  stands for the elasticity of substitution between the
two goods. Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that F = I  , the optimal consumption
pattern of a household n with real income Yn is given by:
Cjn = Yn
pj
P
 
, for j 2 fF; Ig
where pj is the price index of sector j good, P is the composite price index, P =
 

P
j=I;F
p1 j
!1=(1 )
,
which we normalize to one without loss of generality. There is a continuum of identical consumers
in the interval [0; 1], hence aggregate consumption is:
Cj = Y
pj
P
 
; (2)
where Y  R 10 Yndn denotes aggregate income.
Firms in each sector are identical. In a symmetric equilibrium, they all produce an equal
share of the total demand for the sector, hence rms may be labeled only by the industry j they
belong to. We then have that Cj = Njyj , where yj denotes the production of a rm and Nj the
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number or rms in sector j. Nj is xed in the short run, while in the long run it responds to
changes in market protability and is determined by a free entry condition.
Using equation (2) and the normalization of the aggregate price index, we may write the
inverse demand function as:
pj =

Njyj
Y
  1

: (3)
In this way, as a result of Cournot competition among rms, the elasticity of demand faced by
a rm in sector j, j , is positively related to the number of rms operating in that sector as
follows:
j  j(Nj) = Nj : (4)
Thus, in this simple framework, we have that the number of rms, Nj , determines the level of
competition for a rm in sector j. Several alternative ways to model imperfect competition in
the goods market can be found in the literature, e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Delacroix
(2006), Ebell and Haefke (2009), or Felbermayr and Prat (2010). Our main results would not
change substantially when using alternative specications.
Labor is the only input in production. Recent research on informality has highlighted the
fact that informal rms are less productive than formal ones (see, for instance, Taymaz, 2009).
We allow for productivity dierences across sectors by dening production function as:
yj = Ajhj (5)
where Aj stands for a (sector-specic) productivity parameter and hj is the rm's size, that
is, the number of workers employed. The size of rms will be endogenously determined in the
model. We will see that, in equilibrium, rms in the informal sector are smaller, which is in
accordance with the stylized fact described in section 2 and previous ndings in the literature
(see Rauch, 1991 or Tybout, 2000).
Combining demand function in equation (3) and the production function in (5), goods market
is in equilibrium when:
NjAjhj = p
 
j Y: (6)
3.2 The labor market
Empirical evidence indicates that informal workers have on average lower educational attainment
levels (see, among others, Gong and Van Soest, 2002, Gong et al, 2004, and Maloney, 2004).
Since informality would therefore be more a concern for low than for high skill workers, we
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choose to focus on identical workers4 searching for a job in the formal and in the informal sector
simultaneously when unemployed.
Furthermore, we assume that both formal and informal sectors are subject to matching
frictions in the labor market and that they share the same pool of unemployed workers. These
two assumptions depart from other recent works that incorporate search-matching frictions to
study informality, which assume a segmented labor market and takes the informal sector as a
residual perfectly competitive sector.
In each sector, vacant jobs and unemployed workers are brought together in pairs by a
matching function Mj . It maps the number of matches in sector j; Mj ; to the total number of
job seekers and vacancies in that sector:
Mj Mj(u; vj) (7)
where u and vj correspond respectively to the mass of job seekers
5, which is the unemployment
rate in the economy, and to the mass of vacancies in the sector. The function Mj features
standard properties: it is twice continuously dierentiable, increasing and concave in both of its
arguments, it is linearly homogeneous, satises the Inada conditions and the boundary conditions
Mj(0; vj) =Mj(u; 0) = 0 for u; vj  0.
We allow the matching function to be dierent across sectors to be able to capture their
particularities. For instance, rms may rely on dierent methods to recruit their workers in the
two sectors, so that the eciency of the two matching processes may dier somewhat. It is also
often argued that, compared to the formal sector, the informal sector is closer to a competitive
market where it takes less time to match. In such a case, the matching process would be more
ecient in the informal sector, resulting in more matches for the same level of inputs in the
matching function.
On average, a rm contacts a worker at rate Mj=vj while a job seeker meets a sector j
rm at rate Mj=u. Let j  vj=u be the labor market tightness. Linear homogeneity of the
matching function allows us to write those contact rates as Mj=vj  mj(j); with m0j(j) < 0,
and Mj=u = jmj(j); which is an increasing function of j . Thus vacancies are lled at rate
mj(j) in sector j while workers exit unemployment at rate
P
j=F;I
jmj(j):
A few remarks are in order. First, dierences in job nding rates between the formal and
the informal sector can easily be captured with two matching functions having dierent scale
4This is of course a simplication compared to the papers studying the sorting mechanism between the two
sectors (e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006, Albrecht et al., 2009), but our focus is not on explaining sorting patterns
across sectors.
5We assume job seekers are `truly' unemployed. Alternatively, we could assume that they are in fact self-
employed, and that the self-employed search for jobs.
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parameters. For instance, in the Cobb-Douglas case, MF = Fu
v1 F while MI = Iu
v1 I ,
with I  F : Second, the assumption of search frictions in both sectors encompasses the
particular case of perfect competition in the informal labor market considered in several papers.
That would correspond to the limit case where I ! 1 in our framework, i.e. in a fully
competitive labor market, where it takes no time to locate a job oer or to ll a vacancy. Finally,
if it took no time to locate a formal job (FmF (F )!1), all workers would be employed in the
formal sector. Thus, matching frictions are an important reason for the existence of an informal
sector, and the underlying assumption for the existence of the two sectors is that the formal
sector is `suciently' frictional.
Matches are dissolved at rate dj ; due either to an exogenous separation rate sj between rms
and workers or to the exit of rms from the market, which occurs with probability j : Hence,
the sector-specic destruction rate is:
dj = j + sj(1  j) (8)
Workers can be either employed or unemployed so that:
LF + LI = 1  u (9)
where Lj = Njhj denotes employment in sector j, and u stands for unemployment. In steady-
state equilibrium, the mass of unemployed workers that nd a job in a sector has to equal the
mass of workers that loose a job in that sector, that is:
djLj = jmj(j)u (10)
Equation (10) states that when a fraction dj of the jobs in sector j are destroyed, they are
compensated by an inow jm(j)u of job seekers who are recruited in sector j.
3.3 Firms' decisions
Following a growing body of the literature, we depart from the basic matching model by assuming
rms can hire more than one worker. This implies that rm size becomes an endogenous variable
which responds to changes in rm's expected prots. This feature of the model allows us to
analyze the determinants of the relative size of rms in the two sectors. In particular, rm size
depends on the elasticity of substitution j , as we will show below, due to the assumption of
imperfect competition in the goods market.
Firms choose the number of vacancies and its size so as to maximize expected prots, which
can be written as:
Vj(hj) = max
vj ;h
0
j
1
1 + r

pj (yj) yj (hj)  wj (hj)hj (1 + j)  jvj + (1  j)Vj
 
h0j

; (11)
12
where r is the interest rate, j is the cost of a vacancy, j represent taxes on labor costs, and
wj (hj) is the wage function resulting from a bargaining process, which will be derived in the next
section. hj and h
0
j represent the number of workers in current and next periods, respectively.
The inverse demand function pj(yj) is given by equation (3), while the production function
yj (hj) is in equation (5). Notice that, in this setting, rms do not take prices as given in the
nal goods market, as shown by the inverse demand function, and enjoy some bargaining power
in the labor market, given by the wage function.
The number of workers next period, h0j , is determined by the following transition function:
h0j = mj(j)vj + (1  sj)hj , (12)
that is, next period's employment is equal to the number of matches for the vacancies posted plus
the number of current workers that remain employed. Thus, rms advertise as many vacancies
as necessary in order to hire, in expected value, the desired number of workers next period,
taking into account the cost of a vacancy j and the constraints on labor market ows given by
the transition function (12).
The optimal number of vacancies posted is such that the marginal contribution of a worker
to the rm's expected prot is equal to the expected search cost, that is:
(1  j)
@Vj(h
0
j)
@h0j
=
j
mj(j)
: (13)
From the prot function (11), the marginal contribution of a worker to the rm's prot,
denoted the envelope condition, can be written as:
@Vj (hj)
@hj
=
1
1 + r
24j   1
j
pjAj  

wj(hj) +
@wj (hj)
@hj
hj

(1 + j) + (1  j) (1  sj)
@Vj

h0j

@h0j
35 ;
(14)
where we have used the fact that
@pj(yj)
@yj
@yj
@hj
yj+pj
@yj
@hj
=
j 1
j
pjAj and that
@h0j
@hj
= 1 sj : The term
j 1
j
pjAj corresponds to marginal revenue to which the marginal costs

wj(hj) +
@wj(hj)
@hj
hj


(1 + j) of expanding the labor force to hj should be subtracted. Marginal costs diers from
wage since rms take into account the eect of an additional worker on the wages of previously
employed workers.
In steady state rms' size is constant, that is, hj = h
0
j . Hence, from equation (13) we have
that:
@Vj (hj)
@hj
=
@Vj

h
0
j

@h
0
j
=
j
mj (j) (1  j) : (15)
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Substituting the envelope condition (14) into the optimal vacancies condition (13), and using
the steady state condition (15), we get that:
pj(hj) =
1
Aj

j
j   1

wj(hj) +
@wj(hj)
@hj
hj

(1 + j) +
j(r + dj)
mj(j)(1  j)

(16)
Equation (16) denes rms' pricing behavior in steady state, and can be interpreted as a
mark-up equation over total labor costs, inclusive of wages and search costs. Firms enjoy some
market power on the goods market, but also on the labor market, due to the existence of search
frictions. In the absence of frictions, price pj would simply be equal to
1
Aj

j
j 1

wj . Here,
though, the marginal cost of labor also takes into account the existence of recruitment costs
and the impact of an additional worker on the wages of the infra-marginal workers,
@wj(hj)
@hj
hj .
The latter term is negative, as shown in next section. This means that employers exploit
decreasing marginal returns in order to reduce the wages of each infra marginal worker. For this
reason the term is usually denoted in the literature as the overemployment or overhiring eect.
Alternatively, equation (16) can be interpreted as a labor demand equation which relates the
rms' optimal employment and wages choices.
Notice that using the steady-state condition that
@Vj(hj)
@hj
=
@Vj

h
0
j

@h
0
j
; the envelope condition
(14) can alternatively be written as:
@Vj(hj)
@hj
=
1
r + dj

Aj
j   1
j
pj  

wj(hj) +
@wj(hj)
@hj
hj

(1 + j)

; (17)
which will be useful for the derivation of the wage function.
3.4 Wage Bargaining
Let Ej and U denote respectively the asset values of a worker employed in sector j (j 2 fF; Ig) or
searching for a job. An unemployed worker enjoys a ow utility z, which may correspond to e.g.
a combination of home-production and/or ow utility from leisure enjoyed while unemployed.
He has an utility gain of (Ej   U) when he nds a job in sector j, which occurs with probability
jm (j). Thus, in steady state we have that:
rU = z + Fm(F ) (EF   U) + Im(I) (EI   U) (18)
A worker employed in sector j, on his turn, receives a wage wj and incurs an utility loss of
U   Ej when the job is destroyed, which occurs at rate dj . We then have that:
rEj = wj + dj(U   Ej) (19)
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which implies that the benet of holding a job in sector j over continued search is equal to the
dierence between the wage wj and the worker's reservation product rU; that is:
Ej   U = wj   rU
r + dj
: (20)
Workers are not paid their full marginal product as in the standard neoclassical framework
due to a combination of costly search and matching frictions which give rise to rent sharing. Most
of the papers which study informality incorporating search frictions assume that wages result
from Nash bargaining between one worker and one rm in the sector that experiences search
frictions. We assume alternatively that bargaining takes place between a rm and its multiple
workers, each worker being treated as the marginal worker. This is a good representation of
reality when rms cannot commit to long-term contracts and may renegotiate wages with each
worker at any time (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996). This seems an adequate framework to represent
a case like the Brazilian one, where job turnover is extremely high (see Gonzaga, 2003).
Furthermore, this interesting alternative assumption has not been implemented yet in the
literature studying the composition of employment in terms of formal vs informal jobs. We
follow a growing body of the literature that has applied this assumption in studies not related
to informality. See, among others, Bertola and Caballero (1994), Smith (1999), Cahuc and
Wasmer (2001), Delacroix (2006), Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2008), Ebell and Haefke (2009)
Mortensen, (2009), Felbermayr and Prat (2010).
As it will become clear later, bargaining with multiple workers introduces some important
dierences compared to the standard one-worker-per-rm framework, as under the neoclassical
framework where wages equal marginal product. In particular, this gives rise to an overhiring ex-
ternality according to which rms hire workers above the point where the marginal revenue from
hiring the marginal worker equals marginal cost, since by doing so the wage of all inframarginal
workers is reduced.6
The bargain between rms and the marginal worker yields:
(1  j) (Ej   U) = j
1 + j
@Vj(hj)
@hj
: (21)
where j 2 [0; 1] can be interpreted as workers' bargaining power. Using equations (17), (20)
and (21), after some algebra it is possible to show that the wage wj is a solution to the following
dierential equation:7
wj(hj) = (1  j)rU + j

Aj
1 + j
j   1
j
pj   @wj(hj)
@hj
hj

; (22)
6Our framework is fairly general. It is always possible to compare the situation where overhiring is ruled out
to the case where it takes place. It is also possible to allow for overhiring in one sector only. This exercise is
deferred to section 5.
7See appendix for the derivation of equations (22) and (23).
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which has the following solution:
wj(hj) = (1  j)rU + j j   1
j   j
Ajpj(hj)
1 + j
: (23)
Equation (23) can be interpreted as the wage curve, which denes the wage as a weighted
average of workers' reservation value rU and of rm's marginal revenue, captured by the term
j 1
j j
pj(hj)Aj
1+j
The relation between wages and employment is clear when one evaluates
@wj(hj)
@hj
hj : Combin-
ing equations (22) and (23) we get:
@wj(hj)
@hj
hj =   j   j
j| {z }
overhiring (< 1)
j
j   1| {z }
market power (> 1)
jAjpj(hj)
j (1 + j)
< 0: (24)
It is clear from equation (24) that wage depends on a term combining overhiring and market
power eects. The equation also implies that the bargained wage is a decreasing function of
employment. This is due to the fact that the rm's marginal revenue decreases with the number
of workers, since the increased production from hiring an extra worker tends to reduce the price
pj . This eect is taken into account by the rms enjoying some market power. Given that each
worker is treated as the marginal worker, hiring one more worker reduces the wage by
@wj(hj)@hj .
This leads to the so-called overhiring externality.
Notice that the overhiring eect diers across sectors, since they have dierent market and
bargaining powers. From equation (24), the overhiring externality increases with workers'
bargaining power j and decreases with competition j . It vanishes when j ! 0 or j ! 1.
In such limit cases, workers are paid a constant wage: they get their reservation wage in the rst
case, while the marginal product of a worker is constant under full competition in the second.
Such limit cases are more likely to apply to the informal sector, since workers' bargaining power
is smaller in the informal sector and competition is more intense than in the formal sector.
We substitute the wage equation (23) and its derivative (24) into the mark-up equation (16)
to get:
pj =
1
Aj
j   j
j   1

rU(1 + j) +
1
1  j
j(r + dj)
mj(j)(1  j)

; (25)
which establishes the optimal price set by the rm as a function exclusively of variables exogenous
to the rm's decision. Notice that the factor
j j
j 1 can again be decomposed as
j j
j
j
j 1 : It
is then straightforward to establish that the price is decreasing with the overhiring externality
and it is increasing with market power, at given tightness.
Finally, we substitute price from equation (25) into the wage equation (23) to derive wages
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also as a function of variables the rm takes as given when making decisions:
wj = rU +
j
1  j
j(r + dj)
mj(j)(1  j)(1 + j) (26)
Combining equations (16) and (24) we get the equation that determines the optimal employment
choice: 
wj(hj)(1 + j) +
j(r + dj)
mj(j)(1  j)

j   j
j
= Ajpj(hj)
j   1
j
(27)
According to equation (27), rms set employment, and therefore wages, so as to equalize
marginal costs to marginal revenue. Marginal revenue, on the right hand side, includes a factor
j 1
j
< 1, due to their market power in the goods market. Marginal costs, on the left hand side
of the equation, consist of wages, taxes on labor and expected search costs. It is weighted by
an overhiring factor
j j
j
< 1, which establishes that they set hj above the ecient level where
benet from hiring the marginal worker equals his cost. Firms are willing to do so because they
are aware that hiring more workers tends to depress wages paid for their entire workforce. In our
two-sector setting, overhiring should be less important in the sector where workers' bargaining
power j is smaller or where the elasticity j is larger. Typically, that should be the case in
informal sectors where there is a larger number of rms and where workers have lower bargaining
power (see Camargo, 2003).8
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Equilibrium in the short-run
We are now ready to determine the short-run equilibrium where the number of rms in each
sector is constant. Given our previous assumptions, having a xed number of competitors Nj
is equivalent to xing the elasticity j faced by each rm in industry j. Hence a short-run
equilibrium is dened for a given value of Nj for each industry, while prices pj ; wages wj ; rm
size hj and sectoral employment Lj = Njhj , aggregate unemployment u = 1  
P
j=I;F Lj ;
tightness j and workers' reservation value are endogenously determined. In the simulations of
the model we do comparative statics analysis to investigate the impact of some of the parameters.
In particular, we highlight the impact of ercer competition on all variables in the short run
by investigating the impact of changes in the degree of competition j = Nj ; captured by a
change in Nj .
8Notice that the intuition provided here takes workers' outside options are xed. Section 5 studies the impact of
such a wage bargaining externality when workers' outside options are endogenous. It is then shown that overhiring
in the formal sector may translate into underhiring in the informal sector. In any case, there are reasons to think
that the so-called overhiring externality implies a smaller relative size of the informal sector.
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Equations (25) and (26) establish optimal prices and wages as a function of labor market
tightness and workers' reservation value. Using the wage bargaining equation (21) and the
expression that determines the optimal number of vacancies (13), workers' reservation value
from equation (18) can be rewritten as a function of the labor market tightness, as in:
rU = z +
X
j=F;I
1
1 + j
j
1  j
jj
1  j : (28)
With equation (28), the equations for prices (25) and for wages (26) may also be written as
functions of sectoral tightness, as follows:9
pj (j ; k) =
j   j
j   1
1
Aj

(1 + j) z +
1 + j
1 + k
k
1  k
kk
1  k +
r + dj + jjmj (j)
(1  j) (1  j)
j
mj (j)

;
(29)
and wj (j ; k) = z +
j
1  j
j (r + dj + jmj (j))
(1  xj)mj (j) (1 + j) +
1
1 + k
k
1  k
kk
1  k (30)
for j; k 2 fI;Fg and k 6= j: It is worth noting that prices and wages in each sector j also
depend on the other sector's variables, including labor market tightness k. This is basically a
consequence of our assumption that workers search employment in both sectors simultaneously,
which implies that workers' reservation value depends on labor market conditions of both sectors
as stated by equation (28), while wages and prices are themselves functions of this reservation
value.
We now have to determine labor market tightness in the two sectors (F ; 

I ). They are
determined by the equilibrium conditions in the goods and in the labor markets as follows.
First, using equation (6) we get the employment ratio between the informal and formal sectors
that satisfy the goods market equilibrium. We denote it the product market equilibrium (PME)
condition:
LI
LF
=
AF
AI
"
pI (

F ; 

I )
pF
 
F ; 

I
#  , (31)
which denes implicitly the intersectoral allocation of labor as a function of relative prices and
relative productivity, an usual property.
Note that the ratio LI=L

F is a function of tightness 

F and 

I due to the (positive) de-
pendence of prices pF and pI on these variables, as highlighted by equation (29). A rise in 

j ,
would imply a rise in wages (see equation (26)), translating into a higher price. The quantity
consumed thus decreases, resulting in lower employment in the sector. However, as given by
PME condition (31), the relative labor allocation LI=L

F depends on relative (rather than abso-
lute) prices: Since both prices depend positively on F and 

I , the impact of a change in these
9With some abuse of notation, we now write prices and wage as functions of labor market tightness: pj (j ; k)
and wj (j ; k).
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variables on relative prices is ambiguous. It depends on which price is more sensitive to changes
in labor market tightness, which is captured by a condition on price elasticities.10 The compar-
ative statics properties of this relationship is ambiguous as well, since it depends on which price
is impacted the most by a change in parameters in equation (31).11
Second, from equation (10) we derive the relative employment in the two sectors that is
compatible with equilibrium in the labor market. We get then the labor market equilibrium
(LME) condition:
LI
LF
=
dF
dI
ImI(

I )
FmF (

F )
: (32)
which denes the intersectoral allocation of labor as a function of sectoral tightness, eciency
parameter of the matching processes and turnover rates. Hence, the LME condition imply that
the informal sector is relatively larger when its own labor market tightness I is higher and
when the formal sector's tightness F is lower. Moreover, the formal sector is larger also when
its own destruction rate of jobs is lower and the informal sector's one is higher.
The intersectoral allocation of labor in equilibrium is determined when PME and LME
relationships are satised simultaneously. Hence, by equalizing equations (31) and (32) and
making use of the price equation (29), we determine the Intersectoral Allocation of Labor curve
(IALC):12
dF
dI
ImI(

I )
FmF (

F )
=
AF
AI
"
pI (

F ; 

I )
pF
 
F ; 

I
#  ; (33)
which determines a rst relationship between F and 

I .
A second relationship between the two sectoral tightnesses is obtained using the price equa-
tion (29) and the denition of the aggregate price index:
P  = 1 = 
1
1 

pI(

I ; 

F )
1  + pF (I ; 

F )
1  11  :
We get the Price Curve (PC):
1  pI(I ; F )1  = pF (I ; F )1 ; (PC)
which denes a decreasing relationship between I and 

F :
The IALC and PC relationships together determine the equilibrium levels of labor market
tightness in the two sectors, F and 

I ; by means of a xed point argument. The equilibrium
10Dierentiating equation (31) we get that the ratio LI=L

F increases with 

I if and only if "pF =I > "pI=I .
Similarly, the ratio LI=L

F decreases with 

F if and only if "pF =F < "pI=F . Nevertheless, such restrictions may
not always hold.
11We therefore study the comparative statics on the basis of numerical exercises, and we get monotonic responses
of
LI
L
F
to changes in the parameters considered. See section 5.
12As mentioned above, the relationship is not necessarily monotonic. We however check in our simulations that
this condition is satised.
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is unique provided the IALC relationship evolves monotonically with respect to I and 

F , as
represented in Figure 5. The numerical simulation in the next section checks this monotonicity,
and Figure 13 depicts the corresponding equilibrium.
6
-
F
I
F
I
IALC
PC
Figure 5: Unique Equilibrium
Once having determined equilibrium values for labor market tightness I and 

F , all other
variables of the model follow: prices pj  pj(I ; F ) and wages wj  wj(I ; F ) are determined
as a function of tightness in equations (29) and (30). Workers' reservation product rU is also a
function of tightness as a result from (28). As for sectoral employment levels, the labor market
equilibrium conditions (9) and (10) imply:
Lj =
"
1 +
dj
jm(

j )
+
dj
dk
kmk(

k)
jmj(

j )
# 1
, for j; k 2 fF; Ig; and k 6= j (34)
u = 1  LF   LI ; (35)
and, by denition, vj = 

ju
 while hj = L

j=Nj ; where Nj can be treated as a parameter in the
short run, and will be endogenized in the longer run.
From equation (34), employment in a sector is an increasing function of its own tightness
and a decreasing function of the other sector's tightness. The intuition is the following. If, for
instance, tightness j increases in a sector, workers will nd jobs in that sector more easily,
thus increasing employment in that sector. Then, from (35), it turns out that unemployment
decreases when employment increases in formal or informal sectors.
Finally, in equilibrium total income equals total product, hence:
Y  =
X
j=I;F
Ajpj
 
j ; 

k

Lj
 
j ; 

k

: (36)
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Formal and informal sectors are interdependent for basically two reasons : (i) in equilibrium,
demand for goods and therefore sectors' relative size depend on relative prices, as it is clear from
equation (31); (ii) workers search for jobs in both sectors, as established by equation (18). As a
result, a change in sector-specic parameters aects both sectors, as will be shown in the next
section through numerical exercises.13
4.2 Long-run general equilibrium
The next step is to determine the long run equilibrium in which the number of rms in each
industry is endogenous. The timing of events is the following. At the beginning of a period rms
decide whether enter the market. If they enter they pay an entry cost, cj , on top of the cost of
posting vacancies in a number sucient to recruit the desired amount of workers.14 Business is
then started and prots are received at the end of that period/beginning of the next period.
Entry costs entail direct administrative costs as well as indirect costs due to administrative
delays. Several of the entry costs do not apply to the informal sector, such as, for instance, the
ocial registration to comply with legislation. Although it would be fair to say that barriers
to entry are essentially a problem in the formal sector, informal rms may still incur in entry
costs since it may take some time and resources to set up a business in this sector. It is then
reasonable to assume that 0  cI < cF .
In equilibrium, the free entry condition establishes that the costs of setting a business must
equal its prots, as in:
cj +
jh

j
mj(j )
=
1 + r
r + j
j , for j 2 fI; Fg, (37)
where the second term in the left-hand side corresponds to the cost of posting vacancies to hire
the desired amount of labor hj , and 

j stands for prots, which is given by:
j = p

jAjh

j   wjhj (1 + j)  jvj (38)
= pjAjh

j   wjhj (1 + j)  jsjhj=mj(j ):
In the previous section we have derived all short run variables as functions of labor market
tightness I and 

F , which are themselves parameterized by the number of rms operating in
each sector, NI and NF : Hence, in a long run equilibrium, all variables are dened as functions
of NI and NF and equation (37) closes the model .
13The case with identical sectors is studied in the appendix. In that case, the IALC curve becomes the 45o line,
and only the PC curve with I = F shifts as parameters change.
14Notice that, in our setup, rms jump to their steady state size when they enter the market. This is a
consequence of our assumption of linearity of adjustment costs. See Bertola and Caballero (1994) for a model
with convex costs. See also Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010) for an alternative framework where rms cannot hire
a large number of workers in each period.
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Firms' prot opportunities decline with the number of rms operating in the market Nj
since with more rms there is more competition and lower markups. Under free entry, a rise in
the left hand side of the free entry condition (37), for instance, due to an increase in entry costs
cj or in hiring costs
jh

j
mj(j )
must be compensated by an equal rise of the right hand side of (37),
i.e. higher prots, which is obtained by a smaller equilibrium number of rms.
5 Numerical simulations
5.1 Parametrization and calibration
We choose parameters with two criteria in mind: (i) they have to be realistic and coherent
with the values usually used in the literature, (ii) the values of endogenous variables stemming
from the simulations have to be realistic and/or comparable with the values found in previous
studies. We choose the Brazilian economy to guide our parametrization. Brazil is a large
developing country with a sizable informal sector, with the advantage of having high quality
micro data available, which has already been exploited in a number of empirical studies. Hence,
we have both access to data and to other studies that have worked on them.
Our reference period is a month and we use 2003 as reference year. The discount rate
r is set to 0:6434% which correspond to an annual rate of 8% as in Heckman and Pag>12s
(2003). All relevant variables and parameters are allowed to dier between the formal and the
informal sectors. Informal sector rms are assumed to be less productive than formal ones, and
their productivity is normalized to one. The productivity parameter in the formal sector is 2,
capturing a productivity dierential of 100% between the two sectors, as used by other studies
(see, for instance, Ulyssea, 2009). In terms of our notation, we have then that AF = 2 and
AI = 1.
In a recent study, Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2009) estimate that the annual
exit rate for Brazilian rm ranges between 5% to 10%, and they indicate that exit rate is higher
among smaller rms. Since rms are on average smaller in the informal sector than in the formal
one, we use the lower bound of the interval to dene rms' exit rate in the formal sector and,
conversely, the upper bound to dene rms' exit rate in the informal sector. It follows that
the monthly values for the two parameters are set to F = 0:0041 and I = 0:0080 which is
consistent with the intuition that on average rms' turnover is higher in the informal sector, i.e.
F < I . Labor turnover is higher in the informal sector dF < dI . We choose the parameters to
be equal to dF = 0:0221 and dI = 0:0102 which correspond to an annual rate of 13% and 30%
as in Heckman and Pag>12s (2003) and Ulyssea (2009). Finally, making use of equation (8), the
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Table 2: Baseline Parameters
Parameter Sector Formal/informal Description
Formal Informal
Aj 2 1 2 Productivity
j 0.41% 0.80% 0.51 Firms exit rate
dj 1.02% 2.21% 0.46 Matches dissolution rate
j 1.1 0.45 2.44 Cost of a vacancy
j 0.0475 0.1 0.48 Matching function parameter
j 0.45 0.15 3 Workers bargaining power
j 30% 0 - Tax on labor costs
cj 2.5 0.5 5 Entry cost
General parameters
r 0.65% Discount rate
 2.05 Elasticity of substitution
 0.5 Utility function parameter
z 0.05 Workers reservation value
exogenous separation rates are set to sF = 0:0062 and sI = 0:0142 respectively.
The elasticity of the matching function is set to one half, as usual in the literature (Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2001, Shimer, Rogerson and Wright, 2005) while the scale parameter of the
matching function is set to target an unemployment rate of approximatively 12:5% as in the
data (See section 2). According to Camargo (2005) the bargaining power in the informal sector
is approximately 1/3 of that in the formal sector. Those parameters can then be set to F = 0:45
and I = 0:15; as in Ulyssea (2009). By denition, the labor tax rate is nil in the informal sector
and we set the formal tax rate equal to 30% which is consistent with the value reported in the
World Doing Business Indicators for social security contributions and payroll taxes.
Keeping in mind that rms in informal sectors face lower (if any) entry and ow costs
(cF > cI and F > I), we set the remaining free parameters so as: (i) to replicate the size
of the informal sector; (ii) to get a reasonable wage premium (wF > wI); (iii) to have a faster
(more ecient) matching process informal sectors (mF (:) < mI (:)); (iv) to have more rms
in the informal sector (NF < NI) but with a lower size (hF > hI). Baseline parameters are
reported in Table 2.
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Table 3: Main endogenous variables
Variable Sector Formal/informal Description
Formal Informal
wj 0.91 0.77 1,18 Wage
j 0.69 2.18 0.51 Labor market tightness
nj 3.12 5.55 0.46 Number of rms
hj 0.15 0.07 2.44 Firm size
j 6.40 11.37 0.48 Elasticity of demand for a rm
j 0.05 0.02 3 Prots
5.2 Results
The benchmark results of our numerical exercise are summarized in Table 3.15 They match
our targets in terms of aggregate variables, with an unemployment rate around 12% and an
informal sector representing 40% of total employment. Wages are approximately 18% higher
in the formal sector compared to the informal one, which is roughly consistent with the lower
bound of estimated wage dierentials between the two sectors, as presented in Figure 3, section
2. Almost similar patterns can be found in Bargain and Kwenda (2009) and Tannuri-Pianto
and Pianto (2002) for quantile regressions.
The job nding rate is two times larger in the informal than in the formal sector. Although
this dierence is somewhat larger than the one found in Table 1 of section 2, it is consistent
with the viewpoint taken in most existing studies where nding a job in the informal sector is
easier than in the formal one (see, e.g. Zenou, 2008, Ulyssea, 2009).
Also consistent with the evidence, there are fewer and larger rms in the formal than in the
informal sector as argued by Rauch (1991) and discussed in Tybout (2000). More precisely, we
nd formal rms to be approximately two times larger than informal ones. Correspondingly, in-
formal rms are approximatively two times more numerous in the informal sector. The resulting
price elasticity of demand is around 6 in the formal sector compared to about 11 in the informal
one. As a consequence, prots are higher in the formal sector. Having dierent values for the
elasticity is a desirable feature of our model. It implies that the various externalities stemming
from market and bargaining powers are of dierent magnitude across sectors.
15Figure 13 in Appendix presents a representation of the equilibrium. It certies that the key IALC condition
is monotonic in equation (32).
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5.3 Short run analysis
Competition in the formal sector The number of rms in each sector is xed in the
short-run. We rst examine the impact of a change in the number of rms in the formal sector
on the main variables of the model. With this exercise we are able to understand the eect of
an exogenous shock on relative competitiveness between the formal and informal sectors. For
each gure, we have depicted two cases: one allowing for overhiring (letting
j j
j
< 1, the
general case, represented by the continuous line) and the other ruling it out (that is, imposing
j j
j
= 1; the dashed line). We rst discuss the case with overhiring, and in the next sub-section
we compare it to the case with no overhiring.
Figure 6 about here
Figures 6 and 7 depict how the economy reacts to an exogenous variation of += 20% of the
number of rms in the formal sector compared to the baseline case. The eect of an increase
in the number of formal rms is unambiguously (i) a fall in unemployment, though this eect
is of moderate magnitude, (ii) a marked rise in the relative size of the formal sector in total
employment, though (iii) the relative size of each rm in the formal sector tends to decrease.
Finally, it can be seen that (iv) each formal rm pays a relatively higher wage compared to the
informal sector when competition in the formal sector becomes ercer.
Figure 7 about here
These results can be understood by looking at labor market tightnesses and prices. We
see that a rise in competition in the formal sector aects tightness in opposite ways across
sectors: tightness increases in the formal sector (F ), while it decreases in the informal one (I).
Therefore, this suggests that this is mainly a result of an upward move of the IALC curve in
Figure 5, assuming that the IALC relationship is monotonically increasing. This results in a rise
in pI and a fall in pF , so that the relative price pI=pF goes up. The increase in informal sector
relative price explains the fall in relative employment in that sector observed in Figure 6, since
LI=LF = (AF =AI) (pI=pF )
 , from the PME condition (31). In addition, we see from Figure 7
that this change in relative employment corresponds to a rise in formal sector employment LF
and a fall in informal sector employment LI .
The decrease in the relative size of formal sector rms corresponds to a fall in rm size in both
sectors, as shown in Figure 7. Employment in sector j is equal to Lj = Njhj . In this exercise,
the number of rms is xed in the informal sector. Hence, the fall in sectoral employment LI
translates into a decrease in rm size hI . For the formal sector, total employment LF rises, but
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so does the number of rms NF . The fact that rm size decreases in that sector means that the
rst eect dominates the latter.
Figure 7 also shows that the change in relative wages corresponds to a rise in wages in both
sectors. This is the result of two opposite eects, since F goes up while I goes down. We
can therefore conclude that the rise in F induces a rise in both wages, which dominates the
negative eect of the fall in I :
Overall, if the formal sector were more similar to the informal one in terms of the degree
of competition, then aggregate employment would be slightly higher while the informal sector
would represent a signicantly lower share of total employment. Wages would increase in both
sectors, with a relatively larger increase in the informal sector. Firms' prots, however, would
be negatively impacted.
The role of wage bargaining externality We now compare the cases with and without
overhiring, when there is an increase in the number of formal sector rms. It turns out that : (i)
unemployment is lower in the presence of overhiring, compared to the case with no overhiring,
as expected. In relative terms, we also see from Figure 6 that the impact of overhiring is larger
in the formal sector. (ii) The relative size of the formal sector in total employment is higher,
(iii) formal rms are larger and (iv) they pay higher relative wages with overhiring compared to
without. Informal rms, on the other hand, are smaller in the presence of overhiring.
These results can be understood by comparing tightnesses and prices with and without
overhiring in the previous gures. We see that tightness is larger in the formal sector and
lower in the informal sector with overhiring. Otherwise stated, overhiring in the formal sector
(ohF  noohF ) translates into underhiring in the informal sector (ohI  noohI ): While the wage
bargaining externality studied in sub-section 3.4 takes place in both sectors, it leads to overhiring
in the formal sector, but to underhiring in the informal one, as a result of the interplay between
the two sectors. Notice that this result contrasts with what would prevail if the two sectors where
perfectly identical. Such a case is studied in the appendix where we show that the presence of
overhiring would make tightness larger in the two sectors. Those results can be paralleled with
those highlighted in Mortensen (2009) in a matching model with large rms where workers can
search on-the-job16.
In terms of the equilibrium representation in Figure 5, the comparison of I and F with
and without overhiring suggests that the IALC curve with overhiring is above the one without
overhiring.
16Compared to Mortensen's paper, our results are driven by simultaneous search in the two sectors rather than
by on-the-job search.
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As a result, the price pI is larger with overhiring while the converse is true for pF , so that the
price ratio pI=pF is higher, leading to a smaller relative size of the informal sector, as depicted in
Figure 8. In a nutshell, the so-called overhiring externality leads to higher aggregate employment
and a lower proportion of informal jobs in total employment.
5.4 Long run analysis
Entry costs We now study the long-run impact of a change in entry costs in the formal sector
cF on unemployment u, the share of informal employment LI=LF , relative rms' size hI=hF ,
and relative wages wI=wF .
A decrease in formal sector entry costs would decrease the number of formal sector rms in
the long-run. Hence, the long-run impacts of decreasing entry costs are very similar qualitatively
to the impact of increasing the number of rms in the formal sector studied in the previous
subsection. In particular, almost similar patterns for j and pj can be found in the long and in
the short run.
Figure 8 about here
The quantitative eects are, however, not exactly the same. A decrease in the entry costs not
only increases the number of rms operating in the formal sector, but also decreases the number
of informal rms, though this latter eect is of smaller magnitude. As a result, price elasticities
increase for formal sector rms and slightly decrease in the informal sector. This implies that
even if the eects do not dier qualitatively between gures 6 and 8, they should be somewhat
dierent in quantitative terms since price elasticities are slightly dierent. In particular, higher
price elasticities in the formal sector also imply smaller prots. The impact is then larger on the
formal sector than on the informal one, as can be seen from Figure 9 that shows that relative
price elasticity I=F = NI=NF is positively related to entry costs.
Figure 9 about here
There are some noteworthy eects on the labor market. Formal employment increases with
lower entry costs in the formal sector, while informal employment and unemployment decrease.
From these results, we can conclude that the drop in informality is more than compensated by
the rise in formal employment, resulting in lower unemployment.17 Finally, changes in sectoral
employment also increase rms' size in both sectors. This eect is higher in the informal sector
where the number of operating rms decreases.
17Notice that while this is true in our numerical exercise, it is not necessarily the case for alternative numerical
congurations.
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Overall, it turns out that a decrease in cF ; due to e.g. a waning in the product market
regulation, would lead to lower unemployment and a smaller share of informal jobs in total
employment. Wages would then be higher in both sectors, with a smaller wage ratio wI=wF .
As we have seen in section 2, the Brazilian economy has experienced a simultaneous reduction
in informality and in unemployment over the past the case. These movements, however, were
accompanied by an increase in informal sector relative wages. Hence, a decrease in formal
sector entry costs cannot fully account for the pattern of changes of Brazilian variables.
Bargaining power We now study the long-run impact of a change in workers bargaining
power in the formal sector F on unemployment u, share of informal employment LI=LF , relative
rms' size hI=hF , and relative wages wI=wF . Note that the bargaining power variable should be
interpreted here as resulting from institutions that impede the functioning of the labor market
and allow workers to extract rents, as in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) or Ebell and Haefke
(2009). Figures 10 and 12 display how the economy reacts to a (quite large) exogenous change
of workers' bargaining power in the formal sector, which ranges from 0:35 to 0:55. The long-run
impact of changing workers' bargaining power is a combination of its direct impact and of its
impact on the number of rms in each sector in the long-run equilibrium, NI and NF . Lower
workers' bargaining power increases prots, which, in turn, should lead to a higher number of
rms. The eect is larger in the formal sector, as can be seen from Figure 12, where the relative
elasticity I=F = NI=NF decreases with a lower F .
The eect of a decrease in formal workers bargaining power is unambiguously (i) a decrease
in unemployment, (ii) a decrease in informal employment relative to formal employment and
(iii) a rise in the relative size of informal rms compared to formal rms, and (iv) an increase
in relative wages wI=wF .
Figure 10 about here
These results can be understood with the analysis of the impact of F on tightnesses and
prices as depicted on Figure 11. A decrease in bargaining power F results in a rise in tightness
for both sectors, I and F : This suggests an upward shift of the PC curve in Figure 5. This
leads to a rise in the price in the informal sector pI : The price pF , however, decreases despite
higher tightness, as a result of the decrease in labor costs due to lower bargaining power of the
sector's workers.
Figure 11 about here
28
In turn, the relative price pI=pF goes up, which explains the decrease in LI=LF = (AF =AI) (pI=pF )
 
in Figure 10. Wages decrease in both sectors, in spite of the increase in tightness: the fall in
bargaining power more than compensates the rise in tightnesses. As can be inferred from equa-
tion (26), F only aects the informal wage through workers' reservation utility while formal
wages are also aected directly. It follows that wages decrease by a larger amount in the formal
sector, so that relative wages wI=wF increase.
Note that, as shown in Figure 10, formal sector employment increases when their workers
have lower bargaining power. In the informal sector, on the other hand, employment drops with
smaller F . Unemployment, on its turn, always decreases with lower F , meaning that the rise
in formal employment is larger than the fall in informal employment. Hence, it appears that
the impact of changes in formal employment on unemployment is cushioned by the informal
sector. With respect to the number of operating rms, it increases in the formal sector and
slightly decreases in the informal sector. This translates in changes in rms' size in each sector
as follows. In the formal sector, rms' size hF decreases as a result of the increase in formal
employment LF and in the number of operating rms, NF , the eect being of a relatively large
magnitude. However, rms' size reacts less in the informal sector due to the fact that the
number of operating rms in that sector is hardly aected by changes in the bargaining power.
It then turns out informal rm's size is slightly decreased. As a result, rms' relative size, hI=hF
increases, following a drop in F .
Figure 12 about here
Overall, it turns out that if the formal sector were more similar to the informal one in
terms of bargaining power (lower F ; due to a cutback in labor market regulation, for instance),
then unemployment would be lower, and the informal sector would represent a lower share
of total employment. Moreover, the wage ratio wI=wF would increase. This set of eects is
compatible with the stylized facts observed for the Brazilian economy since 2002: unemployment
and informality decreased, while informal sector relative wage increased.
6 Conclusion
Using a matching model with large rms similar in spirit to Delacroix (2006) and Ebell and Hae-
fke (2009), we have studied the impact of product and labor market regulations on equilibrium
unemployment, the size of formal and informal sectors and wages. Our model endogenously
generates a less competitive formal sector, which is a common assumption taken by previous
literature. In this setting, we have shown that a fall in PMR strictness (captured by a fall in
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entry costs in the formal sector) reduces the size of the informal sector and unemployment while
it raises wages. Conversely, a fall in LMR (captured by a fall in workers' bargaining power
in the formal sector) reduces both unemployment and informality while it reduces wages. For
policy purposes, this means that it is possible to reduce informality without diminishing wages
by reducing PMR instead of LMR strictness, or by reducing both simultaneously. Notice that,
in this case, although wages would increase, wage inequality would increase with the rise in the
formal sector wage premium. Finally, we consider the eects of wage bargaining in both sectors,
which leads to `overhiring' in the formal sector. This translates into a smaller relative size of
the informal sector.
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7 Technical Appendix
7.1 Wage determination
Substituting equations (17) and (20) into equation (21) we get:
(1  j)wj   rU
r + dj
=
j
(r + dj)(1 + j)

Aj
j   1
j
pj  

wj(hj) +
@wj(hj)
@hj
hj

(1 + j)

or
wj = (1  j)rU + j
1 + j

Aj
j   1
j
pj   @wj(hj)
@hj
hj(1 + j)

or
@wj(hj)
@hj
+
1
jhj
wj  
(1  j)rU + j j 1j(1+j)pjAj
jhj
= 0 (39)
which denes the wage wj as a solution to a dierential equation of the form
@wj
@hj
+F (hj)wj(hj)+
G(hj) = 0; with F (hj) =
1
jhj
and G(hj) =  
(1 j)rU+j j 1j(1+j)pjAj
jhj
. Equation (39) admits as a
solution
wj(hj) =

K  
Z hj
0
G()
H()
d

H(hj) (40)
where H(:) solves the homogeneous equation dH=dhj +F (hj)H(hj) = 0 which can be rewritten
dH=dhj
H(hj)
=  F (hj) or hj dH=dhj
H(hj)
=  1=j
Thus
H(hj) = h
 1=j
j
As in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), we assume the wage wj is bounded at hj = 0, which implies
K = 0 in equation (40). wj can then be rewritten as:
wj(hj) = h
 1=j
j
Z hj
0
1=j 1

(1  j)
j
rU +
j   1
j(1 + j)
pj()Aj

d
= (1  j)rU + j j   1
j(1 + j)
h
 1=j
j Aj
Z hj
0
1=j 1pj()d
Integrating by parts and using the fact that dpj=d =  pj=j according to equation (3), so
that
R lj
0 
1=j 1pj()d =
jj
j j h
1=j
j pj(hj). This leads to equation (23):
wj(hj) = (1  j)rU + j j   1
j   j
Ajpj(hj)
(1 + j)
:
7.2 Summary of equilibrium relationships
7.2.1 Short-run equilibrium
A short-run equilibrium is dened as a tuple (rU; pj ; w

j ; L

j ; u
; j ; v

j ; h

j ; C

j ; Y
); with j = I; F;
for a given value of Nj for each industry.
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Workers' Reservation wage.
rU = z +
X
j=F;I
1
1 + j
j
1  j
j

j
1  j (41)
Prices.
pj  pj
 
j ; 

k

=
j   j
j   1
1
Aj
24(1 + j) z + 1 + j
1 + k
k
1  k
k

k
1  k +
r + dj + j

jmj (j)
(1  j) (1  j)
j
mj

j

35
(42)
Wages.
wj  wj
 
j ; 

k

= z +
j
1  j
j

r + dj + 

jmj

j

(1  xj)mj

j

(1 + j)
+
1
1 + k
k
1  k
k

k
1  k (43)
for j 2 fI; Fg and k 6= j: Aggregate Price Index.
P  = 1 =

pI
1  + pF
1 1=(1 )
Labor Market Flow Equilibrium.
Lj =
"
1 +
dj
jm(

j )
+
dj
dk
kmk(

k)
jmj(

j )
# 1
, for j = F; I; (44)
u = 1  LF   LI (45)
vj = 

ju
 (46)
Firms' size.
hj = L

j=Nj  hj(j ; k) (47)
where j 2 fI; Fg and k 6= j; and where Nj can be treated as a parameter in the short run, and
will be endogenized in the longer run.
Product Market equilibrium.
Cj = (p

j )
 Y  = AjLj (48)
Aggregate Income.
Y  =
X
j=I;F
Ajpj
 
j ; 

k

Lj
 
j ; 

k

: (49)
7.2.2 Long-run equilibrium
The next step is to determine the equilibrium number of rms in each industry. We have :
Sectoral elasticities.
j = N

j
35
Free entry.
cj +
jh

j
mj(j )
=
1 + r
r + j
j (50)
Firms' prots.
j = p

jAjh

j   wjhj (1 + j)  jvj (51)
= pjAjh

j   wjhj (1 + j)  jsjhj=mj(j )
7.3 A particular case: identical sectors
It makes sense to determine how the economy would behave in the absence of dierences between
the formal and the informal sector, that is, if there were only one sector in the economy. This
symmetric case can serve as a reference point to be compared to the case studied in our paper,
where there are two dierent sectors.
In the symmetric case, we have pj = p

k = 1; 

j = 

k = 
 and Lj = L

k = L
; which
makes the model particularly simple to study. From equation (29), labor market tightness  is
implicitly dened by:
A =
N   
N   1

(1 + )z +

1  

1   +
1
1  
r + d+ m()
1  

m()

: (52)
By applying the implicit function theorem to equation (52) we carry out a number of comparative
statics which are described below.
Eect of a rise in competition N on wages, tightness and (un)employment. From
equation (52), the short-run impact of increasing competition is unambiguously a rise in . In
turn, this implies a rise in employment L = 2
m()
2m()+d and a decrease in unemploymentu
 =
d
2m()+d . However, this is the result of two opposite eects, as the term
N 
N 1 in equation
(52) can itself be decomposed in two terms: (i) N reduces the markup factor NN 1 while (ii) it
increases the overhiring factor N N . According to (i), more competition leads to lower markup,
higher output and lower unemployment. According to (ii), overhiring is positively related to
market power. A rise in N thus reduces incentives to overhire, and thus tends to increase wages,
which is detrimental to employment. It is straightforward to show that the former eect always
dominates the latter so that employment increases when market power decreases.
Eect of a rise in workers' bargaining power . The short-run impact of raising workers'
bargaining power  on tightness is a priori ambiguous. This is the result of two opposite eects:
(i) a rise in  translates into higher labor costs (the term in brackets in equation (52)) which
reduces tightness . However, (ii) a rise in  increases rms incentives to overhire, which
counteracts (i). It is possible to show that @=@><0 whenever

<
>
(1 + )z + 11 
r+d+2m()
1 

m() + 
r+d+2m()
(1 )(1 )2

m()
r+d+2m()
(1 )(1 )2

m()
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For low levels of  (low competition), a rise in  raises rms' incentives to overhire. As a result,
 and L should increase. For larger levels of , a rise in workers' bargaining power  raises
labor costs and this leads to a fall in  and L.
Eect of a rise in ; z; . The short-run impact of a rise in ; z and  is lower tightness and
lower employment. From (52), those three parameters increase wage or search costs for rms,
which leads to a fall in tightness and employment. On the contrary, the short run impact of a
rise in productivity is higher tightness and higher employment.
Eect of the overhiring factor N N . In the absence of bargaining externalities, the overhir-
ing factor N N in equation (52) would be equal to one, and the resulting equilibrium tightness
noovh would solve :
A =
N
N   1

(1 + )z +

1  
noovh
1   +
1
1  
r + d+ noovhm(noovh)
1  

m(noovh)

(53)
A comparison of (53) and (52) implies that   noovh. This also implies that w() 
w(noovh), and that L
  Lnoovh. That is, tightness, wages and employment are higher in the
presence of the overhiring externality.
7.4 Uniqueness of equilibrium
Step 1. Properties of the price functions (42).
pj =
j   j
j   1
1
Aj

(1 + j)z +
1 + j
1 + k
k
1  k
kk
1  k +
1
1  j
r + dj + jjmj()
1  j
j
mj(j)

(54)
From the implicit function theorem, we get that pj is increasing in j and k:
Step 2. Properties of the Product Market Equilibrium condition (PME):
Combining (48) and (42) we get
LI
LF
=
AF
AI

pI(I ; F )
pF (I ; F )
 
(55)
The properties of the PME curve then results from the implicit function theorem. Dierentiating
(55) we get that the ratio LILF increases with I if the following condition on price elasticities is
fullled:
I
@pF =@I
pF
 I @pI=@I
pI
: (56)
Similarly, the ratio LILF decreases with F if the following condition on price elasticities holds:
F
@pF =@F
pF
 F @pI=@F
pI
(57)
37
If these two conditions are not fullled, then the PME curve is not necessarily monotonic in the
(F;I) space. Nevertheless, our simulations indicate that this is the case.
Step 3. Properties of the labor Market Flow Equilibrium condition (LME).
LI
LF
=
dF
dI
ImI(I)
FmF (F )
(58)
The RHS of (58) is decreasing in F and increasing in I : Therefore, the (LME) curve is upward
sloping in the (F;I) space.
Step 4. Properties of the IAL curve.
Using LME and PME, we get the following IAL relationship:
dF
dI
ImI(I)
FmF (F )
=
AF
AI

pI(I ; F )
pF (I ; F )
 
(59)
which implicitly denes I as a function of F : From step 2, we know that the LHS of equation
(59) is not necessarily monotonic. Here, again, our simulations indicate that this is the case.
Step 5. Properties of the PC curve.
Using (29), the denition of the aggregate price index, P  = 1=(1 )

pI(I ; F )
1  + pF (I ; F )1 
1=(1 )
,
and the normalization P  = 1; the PC relationship can be written :
1  pI(I ; F )1  = pF (I ; F )1 : (60)
Given the properties of prices studied in step 1, this equation implicitly denes a decreasing
relationship between I and F .
Step 6. Properties of the equilibrium.
An equilibrium is the pair (I ; 

F ) at the intersection of the IAL and PC curves studied in steps
(4) and (5). The gure below illustrates the benchmark where an upward sloped IAL curve and
an downward sloped PC establish the equilibrium.
Figure 13 about here
Comparative statics properties of the equilibrium result from shifts of these curve, and they are
studied numerically.
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Figure 6: The short-run impact of varying competition. Continuous lines refers to the case where
the overhiring externality is taken into account whiled dashed lines refers to the case where the
externality is ruled out.
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Figure 7: The short-run impact of varying competition (cont'd). Continuous lines refers to the
case where the overhiring externality is taken into account whiled dashed lines refers to the case
where the externality is ruled out.
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Figure 8: The long-run impact of varying barriers to entry in the formal sector
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Figure 9: The long-run impact of varying barriers to entry in the formal sector (cont'd)
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Figure 10: The long-run impact of varying bargaining power in the formal sector
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Figure 11: The long-run impact of varying bargaining power in the formal sector (cont'd)
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Figure 12: The long-run impact of varying bargaining power in the formal sector (cont'd)
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Figure 13: Equilibrium in the benchmark case
43
